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Did the R2P Foster Violence in Libya?
Alan Kuperman
University of Texas
Austin, Texas, USA 
In the early 1990s, the relationship between genocidal violence and international humanitarian 
intervention was understood simplistically. Such intervention was viewed as always a response 
to, and never a cause of, inter-group violence. Well-intentioned intervention was expected reliably 
to reduce harm to civilians. Thus, the only obstacle to saving lives was believed to be inadequate 
political will for intervention. This quaint notion was popularized in mass-market books,1 and it 
later gave rise to the “Responsibility to Protect” norm.2
By the mid-1990s, however, scholars had discovered that the causal relationship between 
intervention and genocidal violence was more complicated. The prospect of intervention sometimes 
incentivized violence by parties expecting to attract intervention to help their side in a domestic 
struggle. For example, a relatively weak faction might launch a rebellion or armed secession 
to provoke a government crackdown, in hopes of triggering intervention to help them achieve 
independence or control of the state.
Since the late 1990s, I have labeled this dynamic the “moral hazard of humanitarian 
intervention,”3 because the prospect of intervention is analogous to an imperfect insurance policy. 
It may backfire by encouraging irresponsible or fraudulent risk-taking, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of the negative outcome that the insurance was intended to avert. My publications 
have documented this dynamic in several cases, including Bosnia, Kosovo, and Darfur.4 Timothy 
Crawford rightly calls for specifying clearly the cause and effect of moral hazard in each case.5  The 
cause could be a diffuse norm of intervention, or previous intervention in a related instance, or a 
specific call for intervention in an ongoing situation. The effect could be the initiation of rebellion, 
or the escalation or perpetuation of an ongoing rebellion that otherwise might subside.
The moral hazard of humanitarian intervention is not responsible for all initiation, escalation, 
and perpetuation of rebellion. Nor is rebellion the cause of all state violence against civilians. 
However, moral hazard has been demonstrated in several cases to incentivize rebellion and 
thereby foster escalatory violence that harms non-combatants. The scope of this pathology must be 
investigated to inform a rational reassessment and potential reform of the R2P.  Accordingly, this 
article examines what role if any the moral hazard of humanitarian intervention played in Libya’s 
2011 rebellion that resulted in widespread and persistent suffering of civilians. 
Background to the Rebellion
The question of why some Libyans rebelled in 2011 is especially interesting because they produced 
an unmitigated disaster. Over ten thousand Libyans have been killed, and violent anarchy persists 
while three different governments and hundreds of militias still vie for power and wealth. Fighting 
has sharply reduced Libya’s oil production, strangling its economy and draining its foreign-
currency reserves. A country that traditionally had the highest standard of living in all of Africa, 
1 Most prominently, Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell:” America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 
awarded the 2003 Pulitzer Prize in General Nonfiction.
2 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, “The Responsibility to Protect,” 2001, accessed 
November 7, 2018, http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf; United Nations, A More Secure World: 
Our Shared Responsibility, High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2004, accessed November 7, 2018, 
http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/a_more_secure_world.shtml. United Nations, World Summit Outcome, 2005, 
UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, accessed November 7, 2018, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/
generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_60_1.pdf; Alan J. Kuperman, “The Responsibility to Protect: Ending 
Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All,” Political Science Quarterly 124, no. 3 (Fall 2009), 590-591.
3 For example, Alan J. Kuperman, “The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans,” 
International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 1 (March 2008), 49-80.
4 Alan J. Kuperman, “Darfur: Strategic Victimhood Strikes Again?” Genocide Studies and Prevention 4, no. 3 (December 
2009), 281–303.
5 Timothy W. Crawford, “Moral Hazard, Intervention and Internal War: A Conceptual Analysis,” in Gambling on 
Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Hazard, Rebellion and Civil War, ed. Timothy W. Crawford and Alan J. Kuperman 
(New York: Routledge, 2006), 26-44.
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according to the UN’s Human Development Index, now cannot provide electricity in its major 
cities for most of the day. Human rights abuses have increased, and terrorist groups including al 
Qaeda and the Islamic State have established footholds.
Libya admittedly had flaws prior to the 2011 rebellion, which partly explain why some Libyans 
sought revolutionary change. Libya had gained independence in 1951 under King Idris al-Sanusi, 
whose roots lay in northeast Libya, so he favored that zone with resources including after the 
1959 discovery of oil in central Libya. In 1969, Col. Muammar Qaddafi led a coup that overthrew 
Sanusi, establishing an eclectic dictatorship. Qaddafi hailed from the western coast of Libya, so 
he instead favored that region in distributing oil proceeds, breeding resentment in the formerly 
favored northeast.
Although Qaddafi sponsored and employed military force elsewhere in Africa, at home he 
typically relied on oppression and exemplary punishment rather than large-scale violence to 
defeat multiple challenges to his authority. In 1975, he blocked an army coup and two years later 
executed 22 of its alleged leaders.6 In 1978, nonviolent pan-Islamists attempted to coopt Qaddafi’s 
revolution, so he quashed them by targeting their leaders in Libya and abroad.7 In 1980, Qaddafi 
crushed a rebellion by Air Force officers in the eastern city of Tobruk, resulting in an estimated 
400 combat deaths.8 In the 1980s, an expatriate-led, CIA-sponsored armed opposition group, the 
National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL), attempted to overthrow Qaddafi several times, 
including by attacking his compound in 1984, but he neutralized them via widespread arrests in 
Libya and select assassinations abroad. In 1989, Qaddafi suppressed a Salafist Jihad by imposing 
restrictions on beards and niqabs.  In 1993, members of the Warfala tribe from the western Libyan 
city of Bani Walid led an army revolt, but Qaddafi defeated it and then executed the ringleaders.9
In 1995, Libyan Mujahedin – having returned from fighting in Afghanistan – launched a low-
level insurgency in eastern Libya under the banner of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), 
but Qaddafi declared martial law and suppressed the movement within a few years, imprisoning 
hundreds of its members.10 In March 1996, an exiled former army officer launched another 
rebellion in eastern Libya, but it was crushed quickly, resulting in about two-dozen deaths.11 The 
only known instance of the regime perpetrating large-scale killing of Libyans occurred in June 
1996, when Qaddafi’s security chief responded to an uprising in Abu Salim prison by massacring 
approximately 1,200 inmates,12 allegedly Islamist militants from eastern Libya.
Pivoting sharply in the late 1990s, however, Qaddafi started liberalizing his domestic and 
foreign policy. He shared intelligence with the United States about international Islamist terrorists, 
even prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. In 2003, he surrendered his 
nuclear-weapons program and paid reparations for the Lockerbie terrorist airplane bombing that 
Libya had been implicated in 15 years earlier. At home, he anointed one of his sons, the western-
educated Saif al-Islam, to spearhead economic, social, and political reform.
Saif convinced his father that the regime should admit culpability for the notorious 1996 prison 
massacre and pay compensation to families of hundreds of its victims. In 2008, Saif published 
testimony documenting torture committed by Libya’s Revolutionary Committees, the regime’s 
zealous but unofficial watchdogs, and he demanded they be disarmed. From 2009 to 2010, Saif 
persuaded his father to release nearly all of Libya’s political prisoners, including LIFG insurgents, 
creating a deradicalization program for Islamists that Western experts cited as a model.  Amnesty 
International, in its 2010 annual report, notably did not cite any major abuses in Libya after 1999.13
6 George Joffé, “Civil Activism and the Roots of the 2011 Uprisings,” in The 2011 Libyan Uprisings and the Struggle for the 
Post-Qadhafi Future, ed. Jason Pack (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 24.
7 Noman Benotman, et al., “Islamists,” in The 2011 Libyan Uprisings and the Struggle for the Post-Qadhafi Future, ed. Jason 
Pack (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 195.
8 “Libya Denies Report of Military Revolt,” New York Times, August 19, 1980, A7.
9 Joffé, Civil Activism, 30.
10 Benotman, et al., Islamists, 201.
11 “Unrest Reported In Eastern Libya,” Washington Post, March 26, 1996, A9.
12 “Libya: June 1996 Killings at Abu Salim Prison,” Human Rights Watch, June 28, 2006, accessed November 7, 2018, https://
www.hrw.org/news/2006/06/27/libya-june-1996-killings-abu-salim-prison. 
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Saif also advocated abolishing Libya’s Information Ministry to foster growth of independent 
media. He flew in renowned American scholars – including Francis Fukuyama, Robert Putnam, 
and Cass Sunstein – to lecture on civil society and democracy. In 2010, Saif declared that, “everyone 
should have access to public office. We should not have a monopoly on power.” He added that, “I 
will not accept any position unless there is a new constitution, new laws, and transparent elections.” 
He also brought into the government leading Libyan liberals, who later ironically became the first 
officials to defect to the rebellion.14 
Despite this gradual liberalization, in early 2011 the contagion of the emerging “Arab Spring” 
spurred the most serious challenge yet to Qaddafi’s authority. Across Libya’s western border, 
Tunisia’s longtime president stepped down on January 14, 2011, acquiescing to demands from 
largely peaceful protesters. To the East, Egypt’s president resigned on February 11, 2011, when 
security forces abandoned him following a failed crackdown on protesters. Seizing the momentum, 
Libyan opposition expatriates announced a “Day of Rage” to be held in the country on February 17, 
2011. As detailed below, Libya’s uprising actually started two days earlier and escalated quickly, 
so that by February 20, militants had captured the main army garrison in the eastern half of the 
country, in Benghazi, the second largest city. On that day and the next, top Qaddafi officials 
defected, including the Minister of Interior, Abdel Fattah Younes – who assumed leadership of 
rebel forces – and the Minister of Justice, Mustafa Abdul-Jalil, who became the founding head of 
the rebels’ political wing known as the National Transitional Council (NTC). The official whom 
Saif had appointed to head Libya’s National Economic Development Board, Mahmoud Jibril, also 
defected and became the rebels’ de facto foreign minister. 
Catching Qaddafi by surprise, the eastern rebels moved rapidly west along the coast for 
nearly two weeks, reaching about halfway to the capital Tripoli. Qaddafi then mobilized his vastly 
superior security forces, however, and in just ten days defeated the rebels in most parts of the 
country, driving their main formation all the way back to Benghazi.  The rebellion appeared on the 
verge of failing, as had all previous challenges to Qaddafi’s authority. The death toll after a month 
of fighting – including rebels, government forces, and civilians – was approximately 1,000.15 But 
the rebellion did not end in Benghazi as expected. Instead, based on erroneous media reports that 
Qaddafi’s forces had slaughtered thousands of civilians and were poised to commit a “bloodbath” in 
Benghazi, the UN Security Council on March 17, 2011, authorized military intervention to establish 
a no-fly zone and protect Libya’s civilians. Two days later, NATO states and other intervening 
countries, interpreting their mandate broadly, started a campaign of bombing Qaddafi’s forces 
while arming, training, advising, and coordinating with his opponents, which continued until the 
rebels captured the country and killed Qaddafi in October 2011. 
Consequences of the Rebellion
Although many Libyans especially in the east initially were ecstatic to end Qaddafi’s rule, the 
consequences of the rebellion have proved overwhelmingly negative throughout the country. 
Fighting has killed more than 10,000 Libyans.16 Six months after Qaddafi’s demise, Human Rights 
Watch declared that abuses by the victorious rebels “appear to be so widespread and systematic 
that they may amount to crimes against humanity.” In October 2013, the UN Human Rights 
commissioner reported that under the victorious rebels the “vast majority of the estimated 8,000 
conflict-related detainees are also being held without due process.” Amnesty International revealed 
that these “detainees were subjected to prolonged beatings with plastic tubes, sticks, metal bars or 
cables. In some cases, they were subjected to electric shocks, suspended in contorted positions 
13 “Libya: Amnesty International Report 2010,” (Amnesty International, 2010), accessed November 7, 2018, https://www.
amnestyusa.org/reports/annual-report-libya-2010/.
14 Ethan Chorin, Exit Qaddafi: The Hidden History of the Libyan Revolution (New York: Public Affairs, 2012), 124, 154, 200.
15 Alan J. Kuperman, “A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATO’s Libya Campaign,” International Security 
38, no. 1 (Summer 2013), 118-121; Alan J. Kuperman, “Obama’s Libya Debacle: How a Well-Meaning Intervention 
Ended in Failure,” Foreign Affairs 94, no. 2 (March/April 2015), 69-72.
16 The citations for the data in this paragraph can be found in Kuperman, A Model Humanitarian Intervention?; Kuperman, 
Obama’s Libya Debacle.
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for hours, kept continuously blindfolded and shackled with their hands tied behind their backs 
or deprived of food and water.” Due to pervasive violence, the UN also estimated that roughly 
400,000 Libyans had fled their homes, a quarter of whom were seeking refuge in other countries.
Libya’s experiment in democracy also has proved unsuccessful so far. Following the rebellion, 
Libyans experienced a merry-go-round of seven prime ministers in less than four years. In 2014, 
civil war reignited between two competing Libyan governments: a secular one backed by Egypt 
and the UAE, and an Islamist one backed by Qatar. In 2016, the United Nations sponsored a so-
called unity government, but that only succeeded at expanding the chaos to a three-way conflict.
Libya’s economy and quality of life have plummeted in the wake of rebellion. Oil production 
has averaged barely one-third of previous levels. Consequently, the World Bank reported in 2016 
that, “GDP per capita fell by almost two-thirds of its pre-revolution level, to $4,458.” Fighting has 
closed airports and seaports for long periods in Libya’s two biggest cities, Tripoli and Benghazi. 
Foreign exchange reserves have depleted rapidly from over $100 billion to barely one-fifth that 
amount. As the World Bank concluded gloomily in 2016, “The Libyan economy is near collapse as 
political stalemate and civil conflict prevent it from fully exploiting its sole natural resource: oil.”17
The rebellion also greatly increased the terrorist threat in Libya and its neighbors. Al-Qaeda’s 
affiliate, Ansar al-Sharia, established itself in eastern Libya where, in September 2012, it attacked 
a U.S. diplomatic compound in Benghazi, killing U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three 
colleagues. In Mali, former Qaddafi soldiers of Malian descent launched a rebellion that quickly 
became hijacked by radical Islamist forces, so that by December 2012, the northern half of that 
country had become “the largest territory controlled by Islamic extremists in the world,” according 
to the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Africa.18 By 2015, in Libya, the Islamic State had gained control 
of the coastal city of Sirte.19 Renewal of U.S. bombing the following year succeeded at scattering 
these terrorists but failed to purge them from the country.20
Theory & Methodology
As I have explained in previous work, all potential explanations of decisions to rebel despite risks 
of failure and retaliation can be grouped into five categories (Table 1). Rebels may not expect the 
state to retaliate, so they perceive little to lose by rebelling. They may expect the state to punish 
their group anyway, and so perceive little to gain by not rebelling. They may expect to defeat the 
state without assistance from humanitarian intervention. Or they may expect to defeat the state 
because they anticipate that humanitarian intervention will enable their victory. Lastly, rebels may 
be driven by emotional impulses such as frustration, rather than by strategic calculation. 
Table 1. Five Explanations for Rebellion.
1 Do not expect retaliation
2 Perceive victimization as inevitable
3 Expect victory without humanitarian intervention
4 Expect humanitarian intervention to enable victory
5 Driven by emotion, not strategic calculation
The analysis below assesses which of these five hypotheses explains two critical junctures in 
Libya’s rebellion.  The first is the launching of the rebellion in mid-February 2011, despite Qaddafi’s 
17 “Libya’s Economic Outlook,” World Bank, October 2016, accessed November 7, 2018, http://www.worldbank.org/en/
country/libya/publication/economic-outlook-fall-2016, which also reports that “Foreign reserves will average around 
$26 billion during 2017-2019.” Patrick Wintour, “Libya’s government faces forced currency devaluation,” Guardian, 
November 20, 2016.
18 Craig Whitlock, “Pentagon Helping Organize Multinational Operation in Mali,” Washington Post, December 6, 2012. 
19 David D. Kirkpatrick, et al., “ISIS’ Grip on Libyan City Gives It a Fallback Option,” New York Times, November 29, 2015.
20 Missy Ryan and Sudarsan Raghavan, “U.S. begins airstrikes on ISIS in Libya,” Washington Post, August 2, 2016; Eric 
Schmitt, “ISIS Remains Threat in Libya Despite Surt Defeat, U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times, December 9, 2016.
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history of crushing such challenges and killing or imprisoning their leaders.  The second is the 
perpetuation of the rebellion after early-March 2011, despite Qaddafi’s overwhelming counter-
offensive and the rebels’ opportunities to end the uprising without facing retribution. Sources 
include the following: contemporaneous news reports, videos, and social media; retrospective 
interviews with Libyans involved in the revolution; and secondary material including books, 
scholarly articles, and reports by national governments, the United Nations, and non-governmental 
organizations. 
Launching the Rebellion
The conventional narrative of the outbreak of rebellion in Libya, depicted in both scholarly and 
media accounts, is based largely on misleading propaganda from the rebels’ small liberal wing that 
was well connected in the West. It claims that Libyans launched exclusively peaceful demonstrations 
on February 15, 2011, in Benghazi, and that Qaddafi’s forces responded by killing unarmed 
protesters on that day and the next. The peaceful demonstrators then held a funeral procession 
along a street adjacent to Benghazi’s main army garrison. Troops inside the base shot and killed 
peaceful marchers, which spurred even bigger funeral processions and additional massacres by the 
security forces in subsequent days.21 An army commander, who had been deployed to reinforce the 
Benghazi garrison but who was outraged by Qaddafi ordering the killing of peaceful protesters, 
defected with his forces and thereby transformed the uprising from nonviolent resistance to 
rebellion on February 21. Radical Islamist militias did not join until late February, after the rebellion 
had already gained momentum.
The actual events, however, were starkly different. Libya’s rebellion in reality emerged from 
premeditated violence by Islamist militants in eastern Libya, starting the same night as the ostensibly 
peaceful protests in Benghazi. These rebels attacked a series of increasingly important security 
installations, obtaining materiel from each target to use against the next. They first attacked police 
stations with rocks and petrol bombs to get firearms, which they used to attack internal-security 
forces to acquire higher-caliber weapons, which they employed to attack a military base to acquire 
heavy weapons and armored vehicles, which they used to capture the Benghazi garrison and four 
air bases in eastern Libya – all during the week of February 15-21, 2011. At each installation, some 
of the defending forces defected to the rebels, out of fear or sympathy, thereby bolstering the rebels 
for their next attack. The regime – hoping to avoid escalation, and surprised by the speed and 
intensity of the uprising – was slow to mobilize its key military forces and thus failed to avert these 
initial rebel gains.
Planning of the rebellion was facilitated by the widespread calls of Libya’s political opposition, 
via at least three online efforts in early-February 2011, for a “Day of Rage” to be held February 17, 
2011.22 Although these appeals emerged mainly from liberal groups, especially expatriate Libyans 
in Europe, they inspired militants inside the country to plan violence for that week.23 In Derna, the 
epicenter of Libya’s militant Islamism, “plans were in place from 14 February” to attack security 
21 This false narrative infects even scholarly treatments, such as Youssef M. Sawani, “The February 17 Intifada in Libya: 
Disposing of the Regime and Issues of State-Building,” in Revolution, Revolt, and Reform in North Africa: The Arab Spring 
and Beyond, ed. Ricardo Laremont (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 78, which asserts the following: “On 
the 19th and the 20th [February] the youth attacked the headquarters of Al-Fadhil Abu Omar Special Battalion [the 
Katiba] in Benghazi, which resulted in many deaths. This particular incident [was] led by unarmed youth.”
22 On February 1, domestic Libyan activists were detained for online advocacy of demonstrations. By February 4, three 
online campaigns were reported as calling for a “Day of Rage” on February 17; M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., Libya: from 
Repression to Revolution: A Record of Armed Conflict and International Law Violations, 2011-2013 (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2013), 126, 154, footnote 180; Jason E. Strakes, “The Arab Spring Through a Libyan Prism: Contagion, 
Cleavages and Adverse Transition,” in The Arab Spring, Civil Society, and Innovative Activism, ed. Cenap Çakmak (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 152-153; “Libya Protests: Second City Benghazi Hit by Violence,” BBC, February 16, 
2011, accessed November 7, 2018, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12477275.
23 According to Noman Benotman, a former LIFG leader who had helped negotiate the 2009 deradicalization deal with 
Qaddafi, many of the group’s members inside and outside of Libya rejected that deal as surrender. By late 2010, they 
also viewed the emerging Arab Spring as their opportunity to relaunch an Islamist revolution under a new name, so 
when violence broke out in Libya on February 15, they quickly held a press conference in London the same day to 
announce the new Libyan Islamic Movement for Change (LIMC). Interview with author, March 16, 2018.
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institutions, according to Yasser Ben Halim, a longtime Libyan Islamist militant who participated 
in the planning of rebellion and then fought his way to the capital, eventually becoming head of the 
Tripoli Military Council’s protection forces after the war.24
Qaddafi’s regime tried to preempt the February 17 Day of Rage by arresting a protest leader, 
Fathi Terbil, in Benghazi on February 15.25 However, this only fueled public outrage, triggering a 
premature start to the peaceful and militant uprisings that evening. Though international media 
attention initially focused on Benghazi, the more consequential events centered on two smaller 
cities in eastern Libya – Derna and Beida – both hotbeds of militant Islam.
Figure 1. Map of Northeast Libya. Source: Adapted from Nations Online Project.
Benghazi
Contrary to the conventional narrative, even some protesters in Benghazi employed violence from 
the beginning. They provoked a rapid escalatory spiral with government forces but failed initially 
to acquire sufficient firepower to capture the city’s garrison. On the night of February 15, and the 
following evening, these militants threw petrol bombs and rocks at police and at a Revolutionary 
Committee building, and they set cars on fire, according to local reports.26 Police initially responded 
only with rubber bullets and water cannon, so that most of the thirty-eight injured in Benghazi on 
that first day were security officials, explained a local hospital director.27 Indeed, the future rebel 
leader Mustafa Jalil was still Qaddafi’s Justice Minister, and he later acknowledged that at the time 
he participated in “intense meetings” with the heads of Public Security, Foreign Affairs, External 
Security, Internal Security, and Intelligence, and “every person present said that we needed to 
deal with the events without using force, regardless of whether the protesters called for looting or 
burning or anything else.”28 A Libyan commander later testified to UN investigators that, “only 
after demonstrators acquired arms did the Qaddafi forces begin using live ammunition.”29
24 “Top Tripoli Military Council official wants Sharia law: interview with Yasser Ben Halim,” Libya Herald, May 22, 2012, 
accessed November 7, 2018, https://web.archive.org/web/20120601084346/http://www.libyaherald.com:80/interview-
with/.
25 William C. Taylor, Military Responses to the Arab Uprisings and the Future of Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East: 
Analysis from Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 147. The Libyan government said 
the grounds for arrest were that he had falsely claimed Abu Salim prison was on fire, which incited unrest. “Senior 
Libyan security official gives details on unrest in Benghazi,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, February 23, 2011.
26 “Libyan police stations torched,” Al Jazeera, February 16, 2011, accessed November 7, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/
news/africa/2011/02/20112167051422444.html; Libya Protests: Second City Benghazi Hit by Violence; 14ةنيدم في تاكابتشا رجفت 
ةباصا نع ءابنأو ةيبيللا يزاغنب,”,” February 16, 2011, accessed November 7, 2018, https://www.turess.com/alfajrnews/45727. 
27 “Violent protests rock Libyan city of Benghazi,” France24, February 16, 2011, accessed November 7, 2018, http://
www.france24.com/en/20110216-libya-violent-protests-rock-benghazi-anti-government-Qaddafi-egypt-tunisia-
demonstration, citing a local Libyan newspaper that Reuters says is “Libya’s most reliable media outlet.” See 
“Death toll in fighting for Libya’s Zawiyah 23-paper,” Reuters, February 24, 2011, accessed November 7, 2018, http://
uk.reuters.com/article/libya-protests-toll-idUKLDE71N2BY20110224. 
28 Libyanfreepress, “Mustafa Abdul Jalil, Head of False Libyan Revolution, Admits Ghadafi did not Kill Protesters,” 
translation by Patrick Harned, YouTube video, May 31, 2014, accessed November 7, 2018, https://youtu.be/
Jjf5MTKHbqw.
29 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, March 2, 2012, advance 
unedited version, UN Doc. A/HRC/19/68, 53.
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On February 17, the Benghazi protesters attacked and burned additional police stations, 
security installations, and Revolutionary Committee buildings.30 They seized AK-47s and machine 
guns from a military base in Benghazi’s al-Rahba neighborhood.31 In the city center, they also 
launched their first unsuccessful attack on the Katiba Al-Fadhil Abu Omar, the biggest army 
garrison in eastern Libya and a base of the regime’s internal security 32nd Brigade, led by Qaddafi’s 
son Khamis.32 Government forces responded with their first live fire in Benghazi,33 but aimed to 
wound rather than kill on this day, according to a French doctor working in a city hospital.34 By 
February 18, all police stations in Benghazi reportedly had been burned. Militants also set ablaze 
two internal security buildings, freed the prisoners within, and seized weapons and “ammo for 
various arms.”35 Police officers fled for shelter to Benghazi’s public security headquarters, where 
militants attacked them again and set the building on fire.
Qaddafi reinforced the Katiba with an additional security unit,36 which employed deadly force 
against the attackers and thereby also killed or injured some unarmed protesters intermingled with 
them. The militants used construction equipment in attempts to breach the walls of the garrison, 
and “the young people were making human shields for the drivers of the bulldozers,” according 
to a doctor who treated casualties in the city’s trauma ward.37 Qaddafi’s son Saadi, who also was 
in the garrison, justified the government’s use of force: “when those guys came with weapons and 
wanted to attack the Katiba, of course they were gonna get in and kill the soldiers. So [the soldiers] 
had to defend.”38 By contrast, when the security forces confronted unarmed protesters at the main 
courthouse on February 18, they reportedly fired only teargas.39 The regime survived these violent 
and peaceful protests in Benghazi for five days, until the arrival of better-armed Islamists from the 
east.
Derna
Derna was long known as Libya’s militant Islamist heartland. It was the center of the LIFG rebels 
in the 1990s and, a decade later, the world’s most concentrated source of al-Qaeda foreign fighters 
to Iraq.40 Derna was also the first place in Libya where rebels reportedly obtained military weapons 
to confront the regime in 2011.41 On February 16, less than a day after the Benghazi protests started, 
30 “ةكرابلما ريابرف 17 ةروث,” Revolutions and Changes around the World 2011 (blog), 2011, accessed November 7, 2018, http://amr333-
revolutionsaroundtheworld.blogspot.com/2011/11/17.html.
31 “ريابرف 17 ةروث في ةمجرلا عوردلا ركسعم رود :سيفلا ةفيشر” [“The Role of the Rahbat Military Base in the February 17 Revolution“], Libya-al-
Mostakbal, April 1, 2012, accessed November 7, 2018, http://archive2.libya-al-mostakbal.org/news/clicked/20842. 
32 Bassiouni, Libya: from Repression to Revolution, 156.
33 UN Human Rights Council, Inquiry on Libya, 52.
34 Gérard Buffet, “French Doctor Recounts ‘Apocalyptic’ Scenes in Libya,” interview, Agence France-Presse, February 2011, 
accessed November 7, 2018, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JwHUqPflEPs; François Malye, “Libye: ‘C’était un 
carnage absolu,’” Le Point, February 23, 2011.
35 Translated transcript of contemporaneous phone account, indicated as recorded on February 18, 2011. 
Gahgeer,”Benghazi ‘unde people control’- Transcript of Libyan Call through Feb17 voices,” Gahgeer (blog), February 
19, 2011, accessed November 7, 2018, https://gahgeer.blogspot.com/2011/02/benghazi-under-people-control.html. 
36 Taylor, Military Responses, 148.
37 Paul Schemm, “Battle at army base broke Gadhafi hold in Benghazi,” Washington Post, February 25, 2011, accessed 
November 7, 2018, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/25/AR2011022505021_pf.html.
38 “The Battle for Libya: Killings, Disappearances, and Torture,” Amnesty International, September 8, 2011, accessed 
November 7, 2018, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/MDE19/025/2011/en/, 42. A Libyan government 
spokesman, on February 22, 2011, similarly justified the use of lethal force in defense of the Katiba: “When it gets 
to breaking into an army camp, which has huge stockpiles of ammunition, there was no alternative but to fire [at 
assailants]. As a result, many were killed from both sides.” See, Senior Libyan Security Official.
39 Evan Hill, “The day the Katiba fell,” Al Jazeera, March 1, 2011, accessed November 7, 2018, http://www.aljazeera.com/
indepth/spotlight/libya/2011/03/20113175840189620.html.
40 Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records, US Military 
Academy, January 2, 2007, reports that Derna “has far and away the largest per capita number of fighters in the Sinjar 
records,” accessed November 7, 2018, https://ctc.usma.edu/al-qaidas-foreign-fighters-in-iraq-a-first-look-at-the-sinjar-
records/, 10. 
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Derna’s “Islamist gunmen... assaulted an army weapons depot and seized 250 weapons, killed four 
soldiers and wounded 16 others,” Agence France Presse reported.42 These militants were assisted 
by defection of an army colonel, who “joined them and provided them with a rocket-propelled 
grenade launcher, three pieces of anti-aircraft artillery, and 70 Kalashnikov” rifles, according to a 
Libyan security official.
Two days later, following Friday prayers on February 18, Derna’s Islamist militants launched 
a broader offensive. They attacked the port and seized 70 military vehicles,43 and set fire to the 
general security directorate, internal security directorate, and Revolutionary Committee building. 
As security forces fled, the militants seized control of these installations and the city.44 In one case, 
they captured Libyan officials, locked them in a jail cell, and then burned the building with the 
officials inside, according to a pro-rebel activist.45
The Islamist militants had planned these attacks on February 14, even prior to the outbreak of 
Benghazi’s protests, according to Ben Halim, 
we had all agreed to set off from the mosques, which we coordinated with area residents.  So 
on Friday [February 18], we went out immediately after prayers and headed for all security 
departments in the city. We took control of them. We were also joined by the police force and 
guards. That lasted for about four hours, then we headed for Beida where there was one of 
Qaddafi’s brigades called al-Jareh. We managed to overpower them. After that we went to 
Benghazi – that’s where the real battle started.46
Another key figure in Derna’s uprising was Abdul Hakim al-Hasadi. An LIFG member, he 
had evaded the Libyan government’s pursuit in the 1990s, ending up in Afghanistan at the time of 
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, then fled to Pakistan, and later returned to Libya where he 
was arrested and eventually released in 2007 under Qaddafi’s ill-fated reconciliation with Islamist 
militants. On February 16, 2011, according to a reporter who interviewed him soon afterwards, 
“His military training kicked in. Over the course of the next two days, Hasadi helped protesters 
organize attacks on military facilities and other government buildings in town.”47 In a February 20 
news report, a Libyan security official claimed the Derna attacks were being led by Islamists who 
previously had fought for al-Qaeda before being arrested and released from Libyan prison, and 
who now were calling themselves the “Islamic Emirate of Barqa.”48
Beida
Events around Beida, a city larger than Derna and closer to Benghazi, were crucial to the militants’ 
success. By February 16, hundreds of protesters in the city had attacked and set fire to police 
41 It is not known who led these attacks, but Derna was home to at least two veteran Islamist commanders. Abu Sufian 
bin Qumu fought in the LIFG, then joined al Qaeda in Afghanistan in the 1990s, was captured in Pakistan in 2001, 
held in Guantanamo until 2007, and released by Qaddafi in 2008. Salem Derby was a legendary LIFG fighter who 
had successfully evaded Qaddafi by hiding in the mountains of eastern Libya from the 1990s until 2011. After the 
revolution he was killed in Jihadi infighting in 2015 by the Islamic State. Benotman, interview.
42 “Libya Islamists ‘seize arms, take hostages,’” Agence France Presse, February 20, 2011.
43 Ibid.
44 Akram San, “February 17th Libyan Revolution, The City of Derna from the 16th to the 23rd of February,” February 27, 
2011, accessed November 7, 2018, https://youtu.be/i7r138VQdbs. 
45 Ian Black and Owen Bowcott, “Libya protests: massacres reported as Qaddafi imposes news blackout,” Guardian, 
February 18, 2011, accessed November 7, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/18/libya-protests-
massacres-reported.
46 Top Tripoli Military Council. 
47 Babak Dehghanpisheh, “America’s Islamist Allies in Libya,” Daily Beast, April 9, 2011, accessed November 7, 2018, 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/americas-islamist-allies-in-libya; Dan Murphy, “Why the West need not fear Libya’s 
Islamic warriors,” Christian Science Monitor, April 22, 2011, accessed November 7, 2018, https://www.csmonitor.com/
World/Middle-East/2011/0422/Why-the-West-need-not-fear-Libya-s-Islamic-warriors.
48 Libya Islamists seize arms; Two days later, a Libya government spokesman said that two Islamic Emirates had been 
established: one in Derna led by Hasadi, and the other in Beida led by Khayrallah Barasi.  See, Senior Libyan Security 
Official.
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stations, shouting “People want the end of the regime.”49 That evening, security forces responded 
forcefully, allegedly killing the first three civilian victims of the rebellion.50 As the mob of protesters 
grew, some police and soldiers defected to their side,51 enabling the militants the next day to launch 
armed attacks and overrun Beida’s internal security directorate.52 In so doing, on February 17, the 
rebels obtained heavy weapons including 105mm (known as “106”) anti-tank guns.53 
Figure 2. Beida militants transport anti-tank weapons to attack Shahat barracks, February 18. Source: 
https://youtu.be/Jz2ZkHP1s-I, accessed November 7, 2018.
That night and the following day, February 18, the triumphant Beida militants transported 
their new weapons ten miles east to Shahat to attack the region’s al-Jareh army barracks, home of 
the Hussein Juweifi 165th battalion, which had been reinforced by elements of the Khamis Brigade 
including ethnic African troops. Since February 16, protesters at the barracks had been throwing 
petrol bombs and rocks, but they had been unable to penetrate the base. This changed when the 
Beida militants arrived with their heavy weapons and machine guns, supplemented by armed 
Islamists from nearby Derna. Inside the barracks, a deputy commander and some soldiers from the 
165th battalion defected, providing the rebels with additional weapons and fighters.54 The militants 
used construction vehicles to knock holes in the perimeter wall to infiltrate, then engaged in a 
49 Libyan police stations torched; “Libya, Middle East rocked by protests,” CBC News, February 16, 2011, accessed November 
7, 2018, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/libya-middle-east-rocked-by-protests-1.1029900; “Libya Protests: Second City 
Benghazi Hit by Violence.” Videos of these events are available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EEePa6fUdw0
&index=15&list=PLCE6A19CF14D5F514, accessed November 7, 2018. 
50 “ايبيل تارهاظبم لىتق ةثلاث نع ءابنأ.” Al Jazeera, February 16, 2011, accessed November 7, 2018, http://www.aljazeera.net/news/
arabic/2011/2/16/ايبيل-تارهاظبم-لىتق-ةثلاث-نع-ءابنأ. Skeptics cite evidence that rebel snipers may have committed the early killings 
of protesters in Beida. See Ola Tunander, “Geopolitics of the Libya Crisis: The Use of Rhetoric and Deception to 
Destroy a State,” 25th draft, 2017, 51 (personal communication to author), a revised version of which was later 
published in Norwegian, as Libya Krigen: Bruken av retorikk og bedrag for å ødelegge en stat (Oslo: Sirkel Forlag, 2018).  
51 “Protesters battle security forces in eastern Libya; at least 40 reported dead,” France24, February 18, 2011, accessed 
November 7, 2018, http://www.france24.com/en/libya-violence-crackdown-escalates-protest-benghazi-gadaffi-obama-
tripoli-demonstrations; ,ةينيرحبلا طسولا ةفيحص ”,هل ةديؤم ةرهاظم في فياذقلا ةكراشمو يزاغنب في شرتني يبيللا شيجلا” ,زتريور ،ب ف أ ،أ ب د-سلبارط February 18, 2011, 
accessed November 7, 2018, http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/527947.html.
52 “نايرطلل ةداضلما ةحلسلأاب ينجتحلما فصقي فياذقلا,” Nahar, February 18, 2011, accessed December 5, 2018, https://www.ennaharonline.com/
فياذقلا%E2%80%AE-%E2%80%ACلا-ةحلسلأاب-ينجتحلما-فصقي/; Amnesty International, The Battle for Libya, 37.
53 Coffeeaddict99, “تاحش ركسعم لىع موجهلل نوهجوتم ءاضيبلا ةنيدم بابش,” YouTube video, February 19, 2011, accessed November 7, 2018, 
https://youtu.be/Jz2ZkHP1s-I, shows the weapon and reports that, “This is one of a group of 106 anti-tank guns used 
in the battle.”مارهلأا ةباوب ”.اهلمكأب ايبيل قرحي نأ ديري ناك ةيغاطل ةموتحم ةياهن .. فياذقلا لتقم , accessed November 7, 2018, http://gate.ahram.org.eg/
News/128895.aspx.
54 Patrick Haimzadeh, “Libye: Le Miracle De La Reconstruction Nationale,” Politique Internationale - La Revue 149 (Winter 
2015), footnote 2, accessed November 7, 2018, http://www.politiqueinternationale.com/revue/read2.php?id_revue=
149&id=1433&content=texte. Collaboration between defectors and rebels at the perimeter can be seen in this video: 
Hobby Libya, “Shabab Youth, Battalion and RBG ‘Speed  of Mindfulness’,” YouTube video, September 11, 2011, 
accessed November 7, 2018, https://youtu.be/UZC5j3mOt1Q.
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fierce firefight.55 During the battle, they captured and summarily executed at least 15 dark-skinned 
soldiers, suspected as foreign mercenaries but who may have been Libyan dual-nationals.56
Figure 3. Militants with heavy machine guns and ammunition at Shahat barracks, February 18-19. 
Source: https://youtu.be/3nPg1YThjdo, accessed November 7, 2018.
Shahat to Benghazi
The following day, February 19, the militants captured the Shahat barracks and its equipment, 
including armored vehicles and heavy weapons,57 and then drove some of this hardware three 
hours to Benghazi, which decisively bolstered the attack on the Katiba, according to multiple 
sources.  The Associated Press reported 
a mob descended on a local army base on the outskirts of town and forced the soldiers to give 
up their weapons, including three small tanks.  Truckers drove them into town and rammed 
those too into the Katiba’s walls. Days later, the burned hulks of the armored vehicles can 
still be seen, stuck halfway into the breaches they made.58
U.S. intelligence veteran William C. Taylor reports similarly that, “protesters had also ransacked 
the local arms depot from the Hussein Juweifi battalion [in Shahat] and were turning the depot’s 
machine guns at the al-Fadhil base” in Benghazi.59 Amnesty International also documents the 
escalation at the Katiba on February 19-20, observing that, “by then protesters in Beida had overrun 
the Shahat military base and looted the weapons and munitions there.”60 The attack on Benghazi’s 
Katiba culminated on February 20, reportedly led by rebel Gen. Ahmad Qatrani and his Faileq 36 
battalion,61 and “joined by people from the eastern towns of Derna and Beida, who had liberated 
weapons from local security bases.”62 In addition to armored vehicles, heavy weapons, petrol 
bombs, light weapons, and bulldozers, the attackers’ munitions included a suicide vehicle bomb. 
In preceding days, the Katiba’s troops had worried that funeral processions along the perimeter 
55 See video: Hobby Libya, “Shahat Battalion,” YouTube video, October 28, 2011, accessed November 7, 2018, https://youtu.
be/6mPaafU-IEg.
56 Abigail Hauslohner, “Among Libya’s Prisoners: Interviews with Mercenaries,” Time, February 23, 2011, accessed 
November 7, 2018, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2053490,00.html; Black and Bowcott, Libya 
protests.
57 The first armored vehicle that the rebels seized can be seen emerging from the barracks in this video: Hobby Libya, 
“February Revolution of the city of Shahat... Directed by the first tank February 19,” YouTube video, November 7, 
2011, accessed November 7, 2018, https://youtu.be/vSa-oE91rEQ. 
58 Schemm, Battle at army base.
59 Taylor, Military Responses to the Arab Uprisings, 149.
60 Amnesty International, The Battle for Libya, 42, 102.
61 Paolo Sensini, Sowing Chaos: Libya in the Wake of Humanitarian Intervention (Atlanta: Clarity Press, 2016), 109.
62 Schemm, Battle at army base.
Kuperman
©2019     Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, no. 2  https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.13.2.1705
48
were a security threat, so they had used force to disperse them, which aroused international 
condemnation. On February 20, however, the soldiers’ security concerns were vindicated when 
a vehicle, loaded with propane tanks and explosives, diverged from a funeral procession and 
detonated at the Katiba’s gate, leaving a fiery breach that enabled militants to enter and compelled 
the troops to retreat further inside.63 
Figure 4. Militants emerge with armored vehicles from Shahat barracks and parade through town, 
February 19. Source: https://youtu.be/3nPg1YThjdo, accessed November 7, 2018.
Aware that the Katiba was crucial for control of eastern Libya, Qaddafi ordered his Interior 
Minister, Abdel Fattah Younes, to lead a special-forces battalion to reinforce the garrison on the 
afternoon of February 20.64 Upon arriving, however, Younes realized the tide already had turned 
in favor of the attackers. As other Libyan officers had done in preceding days at installations across 
the east – police, military, internal security, and Revolutionary Committee – he chose to defect 
rather than fight a deadly and potentially losing battle against the now well-armed rebels, to whom 
he surrendered the Katiba.65 The next day, February 21, militants seized four regional air bases: 
Abraq near Shahat, Benina near Benghazi, Adem near Tobruk, and Bombah near Derna.66 In one 
week, the rebels had conquered the eastern part of the country, setting the stage for a full-blown 
civil war. Although Qaddafi’s explanation of the rebellion as an Islamist plot was ridiculed at the 
time by western media, in retrospect it was quite accurate in many respects.67
63 Ibid.
64 Two days later, a Libyan government spokesman claimed that a deal had been reached beforehand with representatives 
of the Benghazi protesters for Younes’s unit on February 20 to replace the Katiba troops implicated in the killing of 
attackers, presumably to alleviate public outrage and deescalate the Katiba protests.  Instead, militants at the Katiba 
escalated their attacks that day using armored vehicles, heavy weapons, construction equipment, and a vehicle bomb.  
See, Senior Libyan Security Official.
65 Hill, The day the Katiba fell; Schemm, Battle at army base. Younes permitted the escape of soldiers who remained loyal 
to Qaddafi. It is unclear if this contributed to the decision by Islamist rebels five months later to kill Younes. 
“Libyan Rebel Military Leader Is Killed,” Sky News, July 29, 2011, accessed November 7, 2018, https://archive.
is/20120715083554/http://news.sky.com/home/world-news/article/16039491.
66 Sensini, Sowing Chaos, 110.  Hasadi apparently assisted in the capture of Abraq and Bombah, the air bases closest to 
Derna; “سصرم ”. : ةنرد في يداصحلا ميكحلا دبع يملاسلإا يدايقلا,, Al-Ahram, March 3, 2011, accessed November 7, 2018, http://www.masress.
com/ahram/65773.
67 Qaddafi defended his actions in a televised live speech on March 2, 2011, as follows: “How the story began? There are 
small sleeper cells affiliated with Al-Qaida…. Suddenly, this sleeper cell in Beida attacked the battalion in the city. It 
opened fire and seized weapons.  It seized weapons from police stations. This was the first fight.  It was between these 
elements and Hussein Juweifi Battalion.... The number of deaths on both sides was 150 or 200… Half of the dead were 
from the police force and the soldiers who were surprised by the sudden attack on their barracks… The people were 
killed at the gates of the battalion and outside the police center.  This shows that the police and the battalion did not 
go out to the street to kill them, but the people were the ones who came to the battalion and were killed at the gate… 
After that, the same thing happened in Benghazi. The Fadhil Abu-Omar Battalion was attacked… After that, the world 
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Other regions of Libya also experienced unrest during the week of February 15-21, 2011, 
including demonstrations and the setting of fires at government buildings.68 However, these actions 
were not as militarized and do not appear to have been led by militant Islamists. Qaddafi managed 
to suppress these other protests by early March,69 so they probably would have been insufficient by 
themselves to foment full-blown civil war and trigger humanitarian intervention.  
Explaining the Armed Uprising
The outbreak of Libya’s rebellion in mid-February 2011, led by Islamist militants in the eastern 
cities of Derna and Beida, cannot be explained by four of the five hypotheses proposed above. 
These Islamists could not have been surprised that Qaddafi responded to their armed uprising 
with forceful retaliation, because they had lived through a similar crackdown on their LIFG 
rebellion in the mid-1990s. Neither could they have feared that the regime would attack them if 
they refrained from rebellion, given that Qaddafi was pursuing reconciliation with the Islamists by 
releasing them from prison and paying reparations to the families of the 1996 Abu Salim victims. 
Nor is there any reason to believe that the Islamists rebelled because they expected sympathetic 
western intervention. These militants viewed the West as the enemy, and vice-versa, and some 
had even been detained or renditioned by U.S. forces in Iraq. Moreover, during the first week of 
Libya’s uprising, the militants openly perpetrated atrocities – including summary executions of 
government forces in Derna, Beida, and Benghazi – seemingly incompatible with any potential 
strategy to attract western support. Finally, Libya’s rebellion was not a spontaneous emotional 
response to a government crackdown on nonviolent protesters, as widely reported in the West, 
because Ben Halim reveals that he and fellow Islamist militants plotted the uprising in Derna on 
February 14, one day before an opposition leader’s arrest in Benghazi triggered the violent protests 
that prompted the regime’s forceful response.
This leaves only one plausible explanation. Libya’s Islamist militants launched their rebellion 
because they hoped to prevail on their own, without any anticipation of humanitarian intervention. 
Their hopes likely had been raised by the recently successful revolutions in neighboring Tunisia 
and Egypt, and by Qaddafi’s release from prison of Islamist veterans of insurgencies in Libya, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq. Foreign Islamist groups, such as Al-Qaeda or Egypt’s revived Muslim 
Brotherhood, may have promised or provided resources that further encouraged Libya’s uprising, 
but there is no evidence of such aid prior to the rebellion.
Perpetuation of Rebellion
Another explanation is required, however, for the continuation of the rebellion after early March 
2011. By then Qaddafi had responded with a massive counter-offensive that compelled the rebels 
into abject retreat, while he offered them ways to end the rebellion without punishment. Compared 
to the initial uprising, key rebel decisions were now made by different actors, under different 
circumstances, for different reasons. The decisive factor in this period was the expectation of 
humanitarian military intervention, as demonstrated by examining the five hypotheses in turn.
Retaliation Unforeseen?
By the first week of March 2011, Qaddafi had mobilized his security forces, which during the 
next ten days drove the rebels back rapidly, reversing their trajectory of the preceding two weeks. 
From March 5 to 15, government forces re-took all but one of the major rebel-held cities – including 
Ajdabiya, Bani Walid, Brega, Ras Lanuf, Zawiya, and most of Misurata – and converged on the final 
one, Benghazi. If it had not been obvious before, by early March it was clear that rebellion would 
provoke an overwhelming government response. Thus, the rebels’ decision to continue fighting in 
March, rather than to flee or pursue amnesty, cannot be explained by failure to expect retaliation.  
started talking about peaceful demonstrations coming under fire and about thousands of deaths.” See “Libyan leader 
vows to fight to last man and woman; text of speech on 2 Mar,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, March 4, 2011.
68 Libyan police stations torched; ”ةيلودلا ”,ةمصاعلا لىإ يزاغنب ِةضافتنا ِلوصو نم َافوخ ..اهبس َوحن اًهرُك سلبارط ُرداغي فياذقلا” (blog), 
(blog), February 16, 2011, accessed November 7, 2018, http://www.doualia.com/2011/02/16/kadhafi-quitte-tripoli-pour-
sabha-regret-craignant-larrivee-de-linsurrection-dans-la-capitale-de-benghazi/.
69 Kuperman, A Model Humanitarian Intervention?, 119-120.
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Victimization Inevitable?
The conventional narrative suggests that the rebels kept fighting in March because they expected 
Qaddafi to commit widespread massacres, so they had little to lose by continuing their rebellion. 
Proponents of this view cite Qaddafi’s threats in speeches during the first month of the rebellion. 
On February 22, he promised to “cleanse Libya inch by inch, house by house, home by home, alley 
by alley, person by person, until the country is cleansed of dirt and scum,” and urged his fellow 
Libyans to “get rid of the rats.”70 On March 2, he warned that, “We will fight to the last man and last 
woman in defense of Libya.”71 On March 17, he threatened that, “We will have no mercy on them. 
We will remove the walls around them one by one in search of them.”72 These statements, when 
quoted out of context by western politicians and media, suggest that Qaddafi was threatening to 
kill anyone associated with the rebellion, who thus had every reason to keep fighting as their best 
hope of survival. 
That is the opposite, however, of what Qaddafi actually said. His speeches repeatedly pledged 
to hold harmless any Libyan rebel who gave up the fight. Indeed, his threats explicitly aimed to 
encourage rebels to disarm or flee the country to ensure their well being. On March 2, he explained, 
“the amnesty that we are offering them amounts to permitting them to leave the country,” so 
they don’t “fight to the bitter end.” Qaddafi offered escape routes on both sides of the country: 
“Whoever leaves Benghazi, Beida, or Derna, they will be able to leave safely via Tobruk [into 
Egypt].  As for those who seek to leave western Libya, they would move to Tunisia...They can 
leave safely.” Alternatively, Qaddafi offered the militants the option of remaining in Libya, if they 
abandoned their rebellion: “We ask our Libyan people to pardon all our children who hand over 
their weapons and go back to their families as if nothing has happened. They will be completely 
pardoned.”73
In his March 17 speech, Qaddafi reiterated this amnesty pledge: “anyone who throws away 
his weapon and stays at home peacefully will be pardoned no matter what he did in the past.” 
This offer appeared credible, because it reflected what his forces actually had been doing as they 
recaptured cities from the rebels in March.  Qaddafi underscored this point: “Throw away your 
weapons, exactly like your brothers in Ajdabiya and other places did. They laid down their arms 
and they are safe.  We never pursued them at all.”74
This makes clear that in the first half of March 2011, the rebels had two plausible options to 
protect themselves other than continuing to fight. They could lay down their weapons and accept 
Qaddafi’s amnesty, if they believed he would continue to exercise restraint as he had in other 
recaptured cities. Alternatively, they could flee to neighboring countries. Not only had Qaddafi 
offered free passage, but the rebels controlled the Libyan coast east of Benghazi, so they had a clear 
escape route to Egypt. Thus, the rebels’ decision to keep fighting cannot be explained by them 
supposedly believing they were otherwise doomed to victimization. 
Win on Their Own?
By early-March 2011, the rebels knew they could not prevail without international assistance. 
Qaddafi had successfully mobilized his counter-offensive, so it was now a lopsided fight. The 
rebels possessed only a few thousand poorly trained troops armed with light weapons and a few 
armored vehicles and artillery pieces. Qaddafi, by contrast, had several battalions of his best forces 
– with superior training and equipment – supplemented by air power. The rebels put up little to 
no resistance as they retreated along hundreds of miles of Libya’s coastline during the first two 
weeks of March 2011, surrendering their gains and leaving them in control of only one major city, 
Benghazi, as Qaddafi’s forces approached rapidly. The rebellion’s end appeared nigh.
70 “Libyan leader says ‘will fight until the last drop of blood,’” text of February 22 televised address, BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, February 23, 2011.
71 “Libyan leader vows to fight to last man and woman; text of speech on 2 Mar,” BBC Monitoring, March 4, 2011.
72 “Qadhafi Promises ‘No Mercy with Traitors’ in Address to Benghazi, 17 Mar 2011,” BBC Monitoring, March 19, 2011.
73 Libyan leader vows.
74 Qadhafi Promises.
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It might be argued that the rebels’ persistence at this point was fostered by military aid from 
neighboring countries motivated by self-interest rather than humanitarianism. For example, by 
early March, Libya’s rebels had obtained weapons from Egypt, following the fall of Mubarak.75 
Two other potential suppliers were Sudan, which resented Qaddafi’s past support of Darfur rebels, 
and Qatar, which habitually supported Islamist militants. 
However, such aid from Arab countries to the rebels at the time comprised mainly light 
weapons, clearly inadequate against Qaddafi’s elite forces. The rebels could not have expected 
to prevail without more substantial intervention, including crucially air power. On March 16, 
Saif Qaddafi proclaimed, “everything will be over in 48 hours.”76 In the absence of humanitarian 
intervention, that prediction appeared credible, including to the rebels as documented next.
Moral Hazard?
The weight of evidence indicates that within two weeks of the initial uprising, the rebels’ political 
leadership had come to view humanitarian intervention by NATO as vital to the rebellion’s 
survival in the face of Qaddafi’s counter-offensive. On February 28, 2011, in a television interview, 
NTC leader Mustafa Abdul-Jalil appealed for international imposition of a no-fly zone: “what we 
want is an air embargo to stop Qaddafi bringing in mercenaries.”77  Foreign officials had already 
raised the rebels’ hopes of such intervention. Six days earlier, on February 22, the UK’s former 
Foreign Secretary, Lord David Owen, called for a no-fly zone on Al Jazeera.78 On February 26, the 
UN Security Council punished Libya’s regime by imposing an arms embargo and referring it to the 
International Criminal Court.79 On March 2, the rebels’ military commander spoke by telephone to 
the UK’s Foreign Secretary “about planning for a No-Fly Zone.”80 
On March 4, the UK announced it was deploying military experts to advise the rebels in eastern 
Libya, which the media rightly characterized as “a clear intervention on the ground to bolster the 
anti-Qaddafi uprising.”81 The next day, British Special Forces and intelligence agents clandestinely 
attempted to meet with rebels in eastern Libya.82 On March 10, France’s President Nicolas Sarkozy 
recognized the rebels’ political wing as Libya’s legitimate government and promised military strikes 
against Qaddafi’s air force bases, during a meeting with the top rebel diplomat, Mahmoud Jibril.83 
The same day, as the rebels retreated rapidly, their political leader Mustafa Abdul-Jalil appeared 
on CNN to plead again, this time in desperation, for a no-fly zone: “It has to be immediate action.”84
75 Charles Levinson and Matthew Rosenberg, “Egypt Said to Arm Libya Rebels,” Wall Street Journal, March 17, 2011, 
accessed November 7, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704360404576206992835270906; Kareem 
Fahim and David D. Kirkpatrick, “Libyan Rebels Repel Qaddafi Forces Near Tripoli,” New York Times, February 
25, 2011, cites a claim that “$75,000 in automatic weapons” had been imported from Egypt in the early days of the 
rebellion.
76 “Libyan Army Calls for Benghazi to Surrender as Saif Qaddafi Says Town Will Fall within 48 Hours,” Telegraph, March 
16, 2011.
77 Alex Rossi, “Libya: Rebels ‘Will Use Force to Take Tripoli,’” Sky News, February 28, 2011, accessed November 7, 2018, 
http://oceanpark.com/webmuseum/2011/libya-2011-02-27c.html.
78 “Live Blog—Libya Feb 22,” Africa, Al Jazeera (blog), February 22, 2011, accessed November 7, 2018, https://www.
maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/9035/libya-live-blog-february-22#.W-OgjPZFxPY.  He repeated the call on BBC the 
next day. See Michael White, “Libya Crisis: Too Late for UN Military Intervention?” Guardian, February 23, 2011.
79 “UN Security Council slaps Libya with sanctions,” CNN, February 26, 2011.
80 “Foreign Secretary Speaks to General Abdul Fattah Younis al Obidi,” Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
London, United Kingdom, March 2, 2011, accessed November 7, 2018, http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-
news/?view=News&id=559394982.
81 Patrick Wintour and Richard Norton-Taylor, “Libyan Opposition Leaders to Get Advice from UK Military,” Guardian, 
March 4, 2011, accessed November 7, 2018, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/04/libyan-opposition-leaders-
advice. 
82 Martin Chulov, et al., “‘SAS Unit’ Captured in Libya,” Guardian, March 6, 2011, accessed November 7, 2018, http://www.
guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/06/liam-fox-sas-unit-libya. On March 3, some rebels initially captured the British 
officials, misunderstanding their intent.
83 Renaud Girard, “La campagne libyenne de Bernard-Henri Lévy,” Le Figaro, March 18, 2011, reports that on March 10, 
“Sarkozy, alors, annonce aux Libyens éberlués et ravis le plan qu’il a concocté . . . frappes ciblées sur les aéroports 
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York Times, April 1, 2011.
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These facts indicate that by the third week of the uprising, the rebels had come to believe that 
their only hope was humanitarian intervention, which they expected imminently. Strong signals 
of support from NATO members, starting in February, encouraged the otherwise feeble rebels 
to continue fighting Qaddafi’s vastly superior forces in early March, rather than accepting his 
offers to flee the country or lay down arms in exchange for amnesty. The rebels also sought to 
attract humanitarian intervention by exaggerating the regime’s threat to civilians, as previously 
documented.85
Although the UN Security Council authorization of March 17 was nominally limited to 
protecting civilians, in practice it opened the floodgates of military assistance. In mid-March, U.S. 
President Barack Obama signed an intelligence “finding” to allow covert aid to the rebels.86 By 
early-April, British military and intelligence officials in Benghazi were helping the rebels establish 
a command structure and defense ministry.87 In mid-April, Qatar shipped French antitank missiles 
to rebels in eastern Libya,88 and “the Obama administration secretly gave its blessing” to such 
arms transfers.89 In early-May, France began airdropping weapons to militants in western Libya, 
trained by operatives from France, Italy, and the UK.90 Without such foreign assistance, the rebels 
would have been quashed by late-March, so that their continued rebellion after that point, and the 
disastrous consequences for Libyans, stem directly from the NATO-led humanitarian intervention. 
The rebels also repeatedly rejected generous power sharing and constitutional reform offers from 
Qadaffi – which could have ended the violence – because they anticipated that intervention would 
enable their outright victory.91
Emotion Not Calculation?
The compelling evidence of a rebel strategy by early March 2011 that was based on expecting to 
benefit from humanitarian intervention and seeking to expedite such aid is inconsistent with the 
final hypothesis, that the rebels persisted due to emotion rather than calculation. It is possible and 
even likely that individual militants were motivated by feelings such as revenge, but the rebel 
leadership’s decisions to continue fighting were driven by strategy.
Lessons
The outbreak of Libya’s 2011 rebellion was not caused by the moral hazard of humanitarian 
intervention but rather by domestic Islamist militants, emboldened by the recent “Arab Spring” 
revolutions and fortified by Qaddafi’s release of veteran Islamist fighters under an ill-fated 
reconciliation effort.  The rebellion was timed to coopt a planned Libyan “Day of Rage” that 
ironically had been devised by non-militant, liberal expatriates.
After Qadaffi’s counter-offensive forced the rebels into rapid retreat, however, their 
persistence is best explained by the moral hazard of humanitarian intervention. Had it not been 
for the expectation, and then actuality, of NATO-led intervention, the rebellion would have ended 
about a month after it started, as the rebels either fled to neighboring countries, accepted Qaddafi’s 
amnesty offer, or were crushed in battle. The death toll of such a brief war without humanitarian 
intervention would have been about 1,000 – including rebels, government forces, and civilians. 
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Regrettably, the moral hazard of humanitarian intervention perpetuated the war for seven more 
months, creating anarchy that persists seven years later. At least 10,000 more Libyans were killed, 
Mali was destabilized, weapons proliferated throughout the region, international terrorists gained 
footholds in Libya, and migrant flows magnified to Europe.
The Libya case thus provides additional grounds for reforming the R2P to address moral hazard. 
I have previously proposed five such reforms,92 most importantly to refrain from intervening on 
humanitarian grounds in ways that benefit rebels unless government forces are targeting civilians. 
For such a reform to be effective, however, potential interveners must sift through propaganda 
to assess whether civilians actually are being targeted. Qaddafi’s regime was focused on fighting 
militants, not unarmed protesters, who were caught in the crossfire. Rebel leaders falsely portrayed 
this as Qaddafi massacring civilians and preparing to commit a genocidal bloodbath, which duped 
western countries into intervening on humanitarian grounds.93 Future prevention of atrocities 
will thus require not only a more enlightened and restrained intervention policy but also more 
competent acquisition and processing of intelligence. That could prove even harder than building 
“political will” for intervention, but it also might accomplish more good. 
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